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THE ANTITRUST MARATHON
Part I: The Role of Monopolization and
Abuse of Dominance in Competition Law
SPENCER WALLER: I'm delighted to welcome you to the fall 2007
portion of the Antitrust Marathon. For those of you who don't know
me, I'm Spencer Waller with Loyola and our Institute for Consumer
Antitrust Studies. Our co-host is Philip Marsden of the Competition
Law Forum at the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law, or BIICL, to make it short. We're gathering here today to
address issues of monopolization law and the abuse of a dominant
position from a comparative perspective. I'm really delighted to have
participants from the EU, Canada, and Mexico, in addition to a wide
variety of participants from the United States. It is an interesting and
diverse group, both geographically and in terms of their experience
and points of view. The structure of what we're doing today follows,
and it's sort of loosely orchestrated and conducted.
The whole point of a roundtable discussion is the spontaneity and the
improvisation of a few of our thoughts and reactions to all these
different topics. Basically, Philip or I will introduce each subpart of
our topic and act as a moderator, calling on the different participants,
and as timekeeper. At the beginning of each topic, Philip or I will call
on a designated commentator who will begin with some very brief
remarks, just to get the ball rolling. If you wish to speak, all we ask is
that you turn your name plaque on the side so the moderator can see
it and the court reporters can be able to see. We'll call on you in
order, and we'll just keep track of everyone around the table.
So it's my pleasure now to introduce our co-host for today, and for
the London portion of the antitrust marathon, which will take place in
April of 2008 on the Friday prior to the running of the London
marathon, I wish Philip great success in his first Chicago marathon,
despite our insanely hot and humid weather. So with that, Philip,
welcome, and any remarks?

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 20:2

PHILIP MARSDEN: Thank you, Spencer. It's really fun to be here.
I'm really glad that Spencer and the Institute are hosting this. I think
that it's even more than just a gimmick that we're doing this in terms
of a marathon theme. There's lots of running analogies in this area.
The topics that we're going to be discussing are ones that, of course,
have engaged us for many years and will for many years in the future.
In the EU, as many of you will know, the European Commission has
been making great strides towards a more economic effects based
approach to many areas of competition law, including that of
unilateral conduct. But on the other hand, the European institutions
are carrying a degree of baggage, for good or bad either way, and
we'll be discussing that, which handicaps it in a way, and its hopes
for a much more economically rational form of policy. And that
baggage is the case law that I think many of us in the room question
but some of you probably favor, and it all focuses on disagreements
about what competition is all about, what is competition law there
for? The historical motivations, populism, structuralism, ordo
liberalism, all of these -ism's I'm sure will come up today. But that's
what the EU is trying to do. The European Commission is trying to
advance and trying to work out a new role for the law on
monopolization, trying to learn from other jurisdictions, but at the
same time, the European courts, and particularly one court a couple
weeks ago, are restraining it in some way. So it's a fascinating
dynamic, and I'm sure we'll be able to talk about it and learn from
each other very well.
SPENCER WALLER: Thank you, Philip. Our first session looks at
the overall role of monopolization and abuse of dominance in
competition law. I want to go to what Philip had said is that we do
all this in the shadow of Microsoft. It's the 800 pound gorilla that is
in virtually every jurisdiction, so it will be with us throughout our
discussion today. It probably should not be the sole focus of our
discussion, but it would be silly to ignore it because it's, in American
terms, the Superbowl of antitrust litigation, and I suppose in
European terms, the World Cup of competition law. The first issues
paper, which I've drafted, posed a very simple question: Is
monopolization or the abuse of dominance a matter of equal and
important concern in competition law to conspiracy law? Or is there a
consensus? Are there any in the United States or elsewhere, on a
global basis, that somehow it's become the secondary stepchild to
questions of conspiracy, particularly in the United States, to other
kinds of hard-core offenses? I raise the issue only, in part, because
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the Supreme Court, in the Trinko' decision, raised it by calling
collusion the supreme evil of antitrust. Presumably, if that's the
supreme evil, then everything else is less evil. I don't think that's
right as a matter of history and policy, but that's the issue. I think
unless we set the table with it, it's hard to discuss all the other things
that we're going to be doing today. So I'd like to begin with our first
commentator, who's graciously agreed to kind of just go first to give
us time to gather our thoughts, and then turn our placards up so we
can have a discussion. My colleague and mentor, David Gerber from
IIT Chicago Kent.
DAVID GERBER: Thanks, Spencer. It's a pleasure to be here, and
to be referred to as your mentor is quite an honor. My thought is just
to throw out a couple of hopefully somewhat provocative ideas in
order to get the discussion started. Two basic points: One of them has
to do with what I call the anchoring of competition law issues, in
particular, unilateral conduct issues. The other involves economics.
The first point is that unilateral conduct norms are better anchored,
more deeply anchored, in Europe than they are in the United States.
Now one can, of course, ask, well, what do I mean by "anchoring,"
but here's what I want to note. In the US, if we look at the situation
with regard to Section 2, there's limited theoretical and political
anchoring. Historically, except in the first decades, there wasn't much
political influence that could be transferred into antitrust law. People
have talked about it sometimes since then, but we didn't have much
of a mechanism compared to Europe because everything was done in
the courts, and there was not much political discussion of it. We
didn't develop a mechanism that would transfer whatever political
energy there might have been into the law itself. So that's a sort of
starting point. And then there was relatively minimal theoretical
support. An article by Einer Elhauge in Stanford Law Review in 2003
showed just how weak the theoretical structuring of unilateral
conduct norms in the United States is. And when one tries to find
some theory in all this, one doesn't get very far.
Think about Europe in contrast. We find there a lot of political and
intellectual anchoring. Political weight still gets into issues of
unilateral conduct. People pay attention to it in the newspapers, as
they have throughout the development of the law in the area. In many
countries, especially before 2004, it represented a very central set of
1 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
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concerns. Legislative involvement has always been important. And
important here is also that the system has needed and still needs, to
some extent, political legitimation, which you really don't have to say
about the US antitrust law system. This tends to make political
factors more important.
Conceptual anchoring: the concept of competitive distortion, which
essentially has ruled, until very recently, the way people think about
unilateral conduct in Europe, provides a conceptual framework
within which unilateral conduct principles make sense. It fits
together with fairness issues in some sense and it fits together with
certain kinds of other issues that have supported European
integration. So if we think about it in terms of what the concepts
around it are, it's got a basis, it's got a kind of theoretical anchoring.
This was especially true during the first decades of development after
the second world war. Right now we have issues with the use of
economic theory. But certainly at the beginning, and for many
decades, classical liberal ideas of freedom and law were keys. They
are often misunderstood today. The focus on power issues and on the
role of economic constitutions to constrain power were very
important theoretical anchors for that area of law. So those are what I
call my anchoring issues.
Now a couple of other brief thoughts on the role of economics. The
role of economics differs between the United States and Europe as a
result of differences not only in anchoring, as we've just seen, but in
institutional structures. And I want to distinguish between two roles
of economics that I don't think are often distinguished. One is the
fact-interpretive role. Here the economist answers the questionswhat has actually happened and what will happen under certain
circumstances. The other is actually what I call a normative role in
which economics actually provide the content of legal norms. In the
United States, that distinction has never had to be made, because
judges, like Judge Cudahy to my left, have been able to make the
decision, by and large, without too much constraint from the outside.
The court system has been able to do this without paying too much
attention to that distinction because it wasn't necessary to make it.
In Europe, that's not the case. The "more economic approach" has
come in against a backdrop of relatively well-developed theories.
And the institutional structure has required justification for giving a
normative role to economics. We see that in the Commission's efforts
to reform Article 82. I think Philip's comments here were very good.
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There's a kind of tension, and even the Commission is never quite
sure in making its statements. Are we talking about economics here
just as a tool for understanding what's happening, what might happen
under certain circumstances, or is it actually providing the norms? In
Europe, it becomes important because neither the courts nor the
Commission are authorized to actually set norms. The Commission
has to be very careful about what it says and what it does, which
leads to some uncertainty, sometimes intentional and sometimes not.
And that distinguishes the role of economics in the context of
unilateral conduct in Europe from the situation in the United States.
Those are a couple of ideas to throw out there.
BERT FOER: I wanted to comment on two recent conversations that
I've had that related to monopolization, and also to relay a quick
advertisement for some stuff that we're doing at the American
Antitrust Institute. One is, we conducted a conference on monopoly
and monopolization in June, and we are about to conduct it again at
the University of Wisconsin, where the University of Wisconsin Law
Review will publish the papers. So a number of interesting papers
will get published soon on this topic. The other thing is, we're
working on a transition report project, and we now have a committee
on monopoly and monopolization chaired by Bonny Sweeney a
plaintiffs' class action lawyer in California.
Two comments: One is, I had a conversation with John Conyers, the
Judiciary Committee Chairman in the House, and he was looking for
arguments to present at an oversight hearing. It turned out that he
didn't show up for the oversight hearing last week, so no real
questions were asked of the FTC or the Justice Department, but he
was preparing. And he seems to be very committed to trying to get
antitrust back on the table, at least for the future. An argument that I
made to him was this: I thought there was a very strange disconnect
between-and Maurice Stucke will read into this because it relates to
some of the things he's been writing-a disconnect between cartel
theory, which the Justice Department avidly supports, and properly
so, and monopoly theory. DOJ seems to understand that it's
important to go after cartels, but they seem to ignore the basic reason
for going after cartels, which is that cartels allow companies to act in
a coordinated way, as if they were monopolists. So why wouldn't
you be trying hard to stop monopolists from abusive conduct and
why wouldn't you be trying to stop highly concentrating mergers
from occurring if you really do care about cartels? I consider that to
be a logical disconnect and a basic criticism of the present
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environment. The other thing I wanted to mention is something that
I'm coming to see for the first time in conversations with
corporations. Some large corporations are beginning to come to a
new recognition that if they face a dominant firm in the absence of an
antitrust regime, they've got a big problem in terms of their strategic
future.
Unless antitrust is active and unless Section 2, and also Article 82,
are enforced positively, this has a huge impact on their future ability
to achieve their business objectives. They are beginning to formulate
a larger concept. That is, AAI used to have corporations come to us,
Oracle was one, in situations where they had a big antitrust problem,
and they wanted help from an organization that would likely be on
the same side for ideological kinds of reasons, but they were only
focused on this one problem in front of them. Today we're beginning
to see some very, very large corporations that are focused beyond that
and recognizing that their whole future lies not in this case or that
case, but in Section 2 being taken seriously. I just want to put that on
the table, because I think we have a prospect now of maybe changing
the political economic environment if we can get substantial
companies to take the side of antitrust.
STEVE CALKINS: Thank you. During the dominant firm hearings
held by DOJ and the FTC, there was a session where there was a
debate about whether persistent monopoly is a bad thing, with one
person saying, yes, it's a bad thing and the other saying, well, I'd
want to know whether it's an efficient firm that's making a quality
product. And these folks disagreed. In that light, it was striking to
me, in connection with the Microsoft adventures over in Europe, to
see Neelie Kroes come forward and in her statements so overtly say
that she is unhappy to see high market shares persist and hopes that
they will go down. And I cannot remember a time when somebody at
the US Enforcement Agency, especially the Justice Department, so
overtly called for the day when market shares will recede. And,
indeed, if you look at the Trinko case that Spencer referenced, you
have the Supreme Court saying that monopoly pricing, quote, is an
important element of the premarket system positively rejoicing in
monopoly pricing, and then emphasizing that Section 2, quote, seeks
merely to prevent unlawful monopolization, close quote, emphasizing
that monopoly is not a bad thing. So in that sort of very fundamental
way, we may have quite a different couple of approaches on the
different sides of the Atlantic on the basic question on whether when
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we get up in the morning we should be sad that a monopoly exists or
not.
JEFFERY CROSS: In reading Spencer's paper, I couldn't help
thinking about the Copperwed2 case, which I had just finished
teaching last week in my antitrust class, so it was on my mind. In
addition to dealing with the intra-enterprise issue, Copperweld also
laid out a framework to consider the differences between Section 1
and Section 2 and why we should treat cartel behavior under Section
1 as being a more problematic issue than single firm behavior under
Section 2. The statements by the Court in Copperweld reflect why in
the US legal system we have somewhat of an ambivalence about
Section 2.
The Court in Copperweld made a couple of key points. First, it is
sometimes very hard to distinguish aggressive, single-firm conduct
from unlawful conduct, because the effect may be the same thing.
The effect may be that an inefficient firm is driven from the market
and that a company may be very well achieving a monopoly through
innovation or business acumen. As Steve just pointed out, Justice
Scalia in Trinko, espoused the idea that monopoly is a part of the
American capitalist market scheme. To Justice Scalia, society should
encourage firms to innovate with the goal of achieving a monopoly
and the3 reward is to obtain for a limited period of time monopoly
profits.

Second, the court in Copperweld raised a concern about false
positives. This is a lesson that we have seen developing over the last
30 or so years from the influence of the Chicago School on the Court,
and that is the concern about false positives and that false positives
could very well chill pro-competitive conduct such as innovation and
the exercise of business acumen. The result is that, under Section 2,
the US courts focus on whether there is bad conduct, the predatory or
anti-competitive conduct that is the second element under Section 2.
The first element being the requirement of having a monopoly. The
focus, then, has become on bad conduct. Of course, it's sort of hard
to say what bad conduct is beyond the blowing up of the competitor's
trucks, as in the Empire Gas case.4 The issue of what is bad conduct
2

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).

3 Verizon Commc 'ns, 540 U.S. at 398.
4 United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903 (W.D.Mo. 1975), aff'd,
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is facilitated by a shifting of the burden of proof. The plaintiff has
the burden of suggesting the existence of predatory conduct. The
burden then shifts to the defendant to propose a plausible procompetitive purpose for the conduct. If the defendant does present
such a plausible pro-competitive conduct, the burden then shifts back
to the plaintiff to show an overall anti-competitive effect. So my
thought is that we need to go back and look at Copperweld and the
features of Section 1 and Section 2 that the Supreme Court laid out
in Copperweld. One result of the differences between Section 1 and
Section 2 as articulated in the Copperweld case is that we have a
"gap" if you will in enforcement - what might be called a
"Copperweld gap." This gap occurs because we will condemn cartel
activity between actors that have much lower market shares than we
would for a would-be monopolist whose unilateral conduct may have
the same effect.
CHRISTOPHER LESLIE: In reading your paper, Spencer, it seemed
that you were concerned that Section 1 gets more respect in the
United States than Section 2 does. I agree with your premise that
cartels and monopolies impose similar bad economic effects. Both of
them will reduce output and increase price. But that assumes that the
violation has been proven. If you've got a violation, they've got
similar problems. One major reason for the difference in emphasis and perhaps respect - between Section 1 and Section 2 is the problem
of proving a violation and the fear of false positives. Many
commentators in America are more concerned with false positives in
monopolization cases than in Section 1 cases. When we see a pricefixing cartel, we're more likely to have the consensus of people that
agree that's a price-fixing cartel; we don't think there's a significant
risk of a false positive. Whereas, reasonable people seem to disagree
a lot on unilateral conduct cases and whether or not the positive is
false or proper. So it seems to me that the tact that we should be
taking if we want Section 2 to be taken as seriously as Section 1 is to
have more precise tests that we can agree on where we can convince
537 F. 2d 296 (8th. Cir. 1976). The government had brought criminal charges
against defendant Empire Gas under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, introducing
evidence that an agent of defendant had procured others to destroy a newly
purchased LP gas bulk delivery truck. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. at 912.

The defendant in the criminal case was apparently acquitted.
A case where otherwise tortious conduct was considered to be the predatory or anticompetitive conduct under Section 2 is Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco
Co., 290 F. 3d 768 (6th Cir. 2002). There, the defendant monopolist ripped out

plaintiffs chewing tobacco racks at retail stores.
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people that we filtered out false positives better than the current legal
regime does. And once you can do a better job of filtering out the
false positives, then you can, I think, attack Section 2 violations at the
same level of intensity that we attack Section 1.
MAURICE STUCKE: Thank you. I wanted to touch on three points.
First, the Department of Justice under the current administration has
an antitrust hierarchy that resembles what you had mentioned,
Spencer. Under this hierarchy, antitrust enforcers should focus
primarily on cartel behavior, followed by mergers, and lastly
monopolies. This third priority's focus is not necessarily prosecuting
anticompetitive conduct by monopolists. Rather it is developing and
promoting objective standards to judge monopoly behavior, so as not
to chill pro-competitive behavior and prevent monopolists from
reaping the rewards of their success.5 The language of Sections 2 and
1 of the Sherman Act, however, does not support this hierarchy. So I
looked at the legislative history of the Sherman Act to see if there
was any basis for this hierarchy. There is none.
In fact, Senator Gray 6 proposed an amendment to Section 2 that
would have limited Section 2 violations to only concerted actions,
namely, combining or conspiring to monopolize. The Senate
Judiciary Committee, however, rejected this amendment since if one
company acted anti-competitively, "it was just as offensive and
injurious to the public interest as if two had combined to do it." 7 So
there isn't any basis in either the statute or the legislative history to
deem coordinated conduct as more evil than anticompetitive
unilateral conduct.
My second point is that under neoclassical economic theory the
anticompetitive harm from monopolists can be as great or greater
than that of a cartel, so this does not justify any such hierarchy. Now,
third, going to my colleague's point about false positives, that's true
5 See, e.g., R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Securing the Benefits
of Global Competition, Keynote Speech presented at Tokyo American Center
(Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
205389.htm; R. Hewitt Pate, International Anti-Cartel Enforcement, Speech
presented at 2004 ICN Cartels Workshop, Sydney, Australia (Nov. 21, 2004),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206428.htm; U.S. Dept. Of
Justice, Antitrust Div., Update: Protecting And Promoting Competition (Spring
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/216254.htm.
621 CONG. REC. 3152.
7 21 CONG. REc. 3152.
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if it is questionable whether the company is, indeed, a monopolist.
But if the company has significant market power, then presumably
there is little, if any, competition left to chill. You also have to
consider the risk of false negatives. From an evolutionary economic
perspective, one wonders to what extent did the monopolist's
anticompetitive conduct chill innovation. To what extent did the
monopolist's conduct retard the introduction of variation, consumers'
ability to select among the variation, and mechanisms that propagated
the selected variation with more variation? With cartels of short
duration involving homogenous goods, you can more readily
envision the "but for" world, namely, before and after the companies
colluded. But with the monopolist, it's harder to imagine the "but
for" world, including what the world would have resembled, absent
the monopolist's anticompetitive behavior, in terms of consumer
choice, variation and innovation.
PETER CARSTENSEN: I want to start by expressing a concern with
a definition that is being begged here, which is, what is a monopolist?
Because once we're past Ed Chamberlain's monopolistic
competition, 8 we're all monopolists. And I think that that's one of the
issues that lurks in terms of Christopher's concern for false positives.
Hang Bill Gates, for all I care. For those of you who are into antitrust
history, there's the famous Klearflax Linen Looms 9 case, the only
manufacturer of linen carpeting in the United States which sold
primarily to the government. The government was mad, so it brought
a monopoly case.
Well, there are very different issues here in terms of creating conduct
norms. I am a little bit concerned about false positives when it comes
to Klearflax Linen Looms if that is the kind of monopoly that the law
cares about as opposed to mere market power. It seems to me that I
don't much care if I lop off a hand or two by mistake, because I'm
concerned with market dynamics-this is very much the suggestion
that was made a minute ago-and that our concern should be
maintaining those market dynamics in terms of the famous language
out of Standard Oil l° , concerning the centripetal and centrifugal
forces of the market, as opposed to a long-term, incumbent
8 EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; A REORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE

(7th ed., Harvard University 1960).

9 United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. MINN. 1945).
10 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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monopolist. So that I think that some of the focus should be on how
you preserve market dynamics. Things that may even raise short-term
efficiency concerns that also significantly interfere with monopolywith the durability of monopoly, should be supported. And so the
Clayton Act section 3, in many respects does represent a kind of
focus on single-firm conduct, that I think reflects a recognition,
historically, that we want to limit the kinds of things that create
barriers to entry.
The last point comes back to a broader kind of historical perspective
that I think is important to understand the case law, its evolution, and
alternatives for your remedy discussion this afternoon. Historically,
Section 2 was used to break up monopoly power. That is, indeed,
what the Standard Oil opinion says: When you're a monopolist, we
execute you, we don't bother to regulate you. And the early doctrines
about monopoly had to do with facilitating structural remedies where
you had a substantial, durable, and remediable monopoly. I think that
that part of the law has been ignored. The discussion here so far has
all been about conduct, none of it has been about structure. And I
would predict that's the way it's going to remain, because we've
morphed over to that focus entirely. And it is something that I think
needs to be reflected on. The occasional execution of the monopolist
may be good. What is it, Jefferson's line about there's blood of
patriots every 20 years. Again, I've advocated capital punishment for
Bill Gates, but I can't get my students to go along.
SPENCER WALLER: So the tree of competition needs to be watered
with the blood of knowledge from time to time. Fair enough.
STEVE CALKINS: And we're all monopolists, so be careful.
D. DANIEL SOKOL: Thanks. Even though we will talk about
remedies this afternoon, it strikes me that when thinking about
Section 1 versus Section 2, we have to be thinking about remedies up
front. Why? Because I think that it implicitly explains a lot of why
we push for enforcement in favor of cartels rather than
monopolization cases. It is fairly straightforward what we do in a
cartel case, some combination of civil and criminal. Now, we
probably still debate what's the correct amount of enforcement for
optimal deterrence, but at least there is agreement, I would think, to
the extent there would ever be agreement between Spencer and, say,
the Chicago School that cartels are a problem.
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I think that, we would be mistaken if we said there was agreement
philosophically in monopolization, in terms of what the appropriate
remedy is -behavioral or structural- and what should enforcers be
doing. I think this is guiding a lot of the hesitation to bring on
monopolization cases, because we're not quite sure what the
appropriate remedy is. I would also suggest that we look at the rest of
the world, particularly beyond the EU.
With young agencies, where are their priorities? Because I think this
is very indicative of sort of global thought, and the move is nearly
always to cartel enforcement. Cartel cases are easier in terms of
detection and because you do not have the problem, as Christopher
Leslie mentioned, of false positives. In cartel cases, you don't have
some problems that we have in monopolization cases. You don't
have the potential manipulation by competitors of agencies to bring
cases that, in fact, do not affect consumer welfare as much they
would competitor welfare. We also don't have the fear of agencies
being captured by special interests and brining or not bring cases
which involve the promotion of national champions with certain
types of monopolization cases. In the world of cartels it is far
simpler- if you are guilty, you are price fixing. There is no national
champion that the agency may be protecting. You are just guilty. I
think those kinds of malfunctions are less likely in the US context
than elsewhere in the world, but it is something that we should
always keep in mind.
SPENCER WALLER: I have in the queue, and I suspect this will
come close to exhausting this part of the panel, obviously this was to
set up all the other issues we were going to be talking about today,
but I have Simon Baker, David Gerber, Philip Marsden, Ken
Davidson, and David Braun. And the shorter you can keep it, the
better, and we'll have plenty of chance to return to all these things.
And we're going to be cycling through the issues of what is a
monopolist and what is the bad conduct and what is the remedy
throughout the day, despite however we slice and dice the topic?
SIMON BAKER: Thanks. Just to Bert Foer's point about the
equivalency of the cartel and monopoly, my only observation on that
is that I see that it's entirely correct. It's a static perspective. I think
fundamentally, once you adopt a dynamic perspective, I think that
analog breaks down. The second point I'd like to make is about this
chilling effect. As a practitioner in Europe, which is the perspective I
bring, some of the saddest days of my professional life are sitting in
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meetings with a corporation being advised by respective competition
counsel who are tabling a discount scheme or a change to their
distribution network, who are being advised, well, you may on this
reading of market definition be dominant; you may on this reading of
European case law be subject to an abuse case. I am then asked, do
you think somebody could build a theory, a fact specific theory of
harm? And I normally have to concede, yes, you could build a fact
specific theory of harm, at which point, the general counsel of the
firm involved says, well, we'll pull this discount scheme, and the
commercial guys in the room jaws hit the floor. And on more than
one occasion, I've subsequently spoken to those commercial guys,
and they've said, well, we lost some business to a smaller competitor
at a price above that which we would have charged had we
implemented this discount scheme, but that was the consequence of
what we're doing. And I've sat in more than one meeting like that.
And those consumer harms are highly intransparent, and they never
come to light. So the enforcement authorities don't get any-there's
no press release from that. There's no bang for their buck, there's no
lobby pushing for that. But I've sat in plenty of meetings like that.
And I'm 31. I've sat in on, I'm sure, there must be a dozen. And this
chilling effect, when you raise it with the European Commission
staff, for example, they say, yes, I see it in British law, and then they
completely ignore you. And I think this is a fundamental tragedy
that's oscillated to the amount of pro-competitive conduct which does
not occur by firms who simply don't understand the legal position
they're in and cannot get clear guidance from it.
DAVID GERBER: Very briefly, and I'd rather follow Simon's
comments, because I think the critical issue, or one of the critical
issues, is what the economists can bring to the table and how it gets
translated into legal terms. One of the problems we fought with and
wrestled with is how to make that-how to get the information.
Referring to Christopher's point before, we, as lawyers, we're trying
to make some distinctions and use economic knowledge, but we
don't always use it very well. We certainly don't use it as well as the
economists do. The other question is, can we find in the economics
literature the kinds of distinctions that Christopher was talking about,
that is to say, those that can really clarify what is likely to be agreed
upon as a harm. I don't get much of a sense that we can yet, although
there are some areas where we can do that. And so I think we can
build on those, figure out how they fit into the legal framework and
move forward to other areas.
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PHILIP MARSDEN: I wanted say a couple things first about theory
of harm. From the Microsoft" judgment a couple of weeks ago in
Luxembourg, one of the main and interesting focuses on the main
theory of harm in the case which relates to the fact that there was a
'risk', not a likelihood, but a risk of elimination of competition. And
that would, thereby, impair or hinder the effective competition
'structure' and any consequent consumer harms are therefore
assumed, and need not e proven by the Commission or the
complainants. So it is because of statements like this that you see all
of this rhetoric about Europe is protecting competitors and not
consumer welfare. I don't believe that rhetoric is correct. But what
the EC is doing is that they're assuming consumer harm, but they feel
comfortable doing so because they've got a very advanced theory on
foreclosure of competitors which focuses on whether or not the
structure of the market is going to be harmed. So, whenDGOComp is
going to try to introduce a kind of structured rule of reason is the
discussion paper or in the policy guidance that might come forward
from Brussels, it's all the more difficult to do that with court
judgments that undercut that. But even in the last draft of the
discussion paper, there are areas which undermine the move forward.
The main mantra of the discussion paper is that the objective of
Article 82 is the protection of competition on the market as a means
of enhancing consumer welfare and insuring an efficient allocation of
resources. This is a huge step forward, and aligns the European
approach on unilateral conduct with its modernized approach on
mergers and vertical agreements. But then the rest of the discussion
paper says, we're interested in also protecting, "not yet as efficient
competitors," That is, rivals that aren't yet as efficient as the
dominant firm. So with such mixed aims there's a real risk there that
when you get to the remedial stage, you're going to see things that
Commissioner Neelie Kroes did suggest might happen, not just with
respect to wanting to see one particular dominant firm's market share
reduced, but also, with respect to trying to discipline Microsoft, and
ensure ongoing compliance, she said back in April that if periodic
penalty payments of $2 million a day were not enough to discipline
Microsoft, then she'd need to look at structural remedies to really
bang her message home.

" Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858 (Sept. 17
2007).
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KEN DAVIDSON: I think it's amazing. Antitrust law is 120 years
old in the United States. It's not exactly new in Europe, although it
seems to me the EU is trying to find ways to make antitrust law
useful. But think about how long it is that we've been active and how
we have not made progress in getting a theory of what it is we are
doing. I see this all the time, going to less developed countries,
countries with new antitrust laws. The people who are administering
them ask me, what are we supposed to be doing? Why are we doing
what we're doing? Why did they make us sign this treaty that says
that we would pass an antitrust law? I have my own answers to those
questions. I think I agree with what Bert and what Maurice said and
probably what Philip was saying, that the problem is a problem that
we saw from the very beginning, that is, the power of dominant firms
to not only charge higher prices, but also to prevent the development
of alternatives. And whether that's through blowing up rail cars, as
was alleged in the Standard Oil case, or whether that is activity
where you put out a false product to screw up somebody else's test
marketing of their products or whether it is something else that isthat goes to the ability of somebody to try and enter, to perform, I'm
not sure that it makes a difference.
I think that unless you can have some kind of agreed framework that
allows people to compete and you don't close off the path-dependent
choices. Beta-max ceased to be a competitive force pushing VHS.
Had that competition lasted, would we now have a better designed
digital solution, a design that is better than the DVD and CD formats
CDs? I don't know. I don't know anybody here who knows that. But
we do know that there was a tipping point. The VHS came in. It
dominated the field. It's now gone. We know that vacuum tubes
were the heart and soul of the computer industry, only to be replaced
by transistors, only to be replaced by silicon chips. Tipping points
are generally signs of Schumpeterian "creative destruction," but the
disappearance of many firms is the result of intentional conduct by
dominant firms that was designed to eliminate competitors. It is
admittedly a difficult problem to separate out good conduct from bad
conduct, but I don't think it's an impossible one. And I think that you
have to recognize that the antitrust laws were passed to keep markets
open, to prevent dominant firms or cartels exercising the power to
control price and technological development. That was the problem
posed in Congressional debates on antitrust laws in 1890, how to
prevent businesses from becoming the kings of industry. You see it
again in the Congressional debates that led to the passage of the
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Celler-Kefauver Act in 195012. The problem is allowing one firm or a
group of firms to dictate to the rest of an industry what the future
shall be.
SPENCER WALLER: Isn't it both as simple and as hard as the fact
that sometimes too much power is bad power?
KEN DAVIDSON: Yes.
DAVID BRAUN: I want to pick up on David Gerber's remarks for a
moment, and I think back to when I served in the antitrust division
under Bill Baxter, and he made a comment that I think typifies the
Chicago School approach to monopolization. He was commenting on
the old approach, and as if to swear at everyone, he said, "atomizers."
I think, though, we need to keep the context that Dave Gerber
provided to us in mind, and I would add one or two comments to
them. We have a very large country, a leading innovator in the
universe, perhaps, and an incredible faith that is assumed in the
marketplace as a self-correcting mechanism. And it is only in the
most rarest of circumstances where we trust government, the courts,
or others to intervene to correct where a self-correcting mechanism
seems to have gone awry. Europeans and others around the world do
not make those assumptions. Their markets, in most instances, are
much smaller than ours. Think of Sweden, 8 million people; think of
Portugal; even think of Germany, 80 million people; and then think
about a tradition that Dave referred to that I would call a government
interventionist tradition and an expectation that government protect
the consumer. Because, historically, consumers were exploited by
government, by kings, by others. And a political consensus of that
intervention, therefore, needs to come at an earlier point, and,
perhaps, in a smaller market, that is not capable of being as selfcorrecting because it doesn't stand as completely on its own two feet
as ours, does require a different approach sometimes. Whether the
right approach is being taken in Europe, I think, is a very interesting
question right now. I think the US and the UK attitude is much more
in parallel than it is once you go to the continent and you have a
different philosophy. And I just ask that we keep that in mind.
RICHARD CUDAHY: I just wanted to make this observation. I
always learn something interesting at these sessions, and this business
about monopoly is possibly being a good thing a good thing, or that it
" 15 U.S.C. §18 (2007).
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can be a good thing, so let's not be against it in all cases. That
proposition seems interesting to me. I had a case while sitting down
in the Eleventh Circuit not too long ago, which involved-and I have
forgotten all the details, but it involved a company that had 80
percent of the market, and the issue was whether they could bid on
the abandoned machinery of a former competitor that went out of
business, and if the 80 percent company succeeded at picking up that
extra equipment, they would then have 90 percent of the market. And
I thought that's an obvious violation of the antitrust law. You can't
do that. Well, my fellow judges took issue with me, and they talked
about standing and all kinds of similar stuff. I thought that the 90
percent market proposition was so fundamental it would overbear
other aspects. My colleague here has been talking about, what are the
fundamentals? If my Eleventh Circuit view was not correct, I really
don't know what the fundamentals are anymore. This gentleman was
talking about what are the fundamentals? I don't really know
anymore.
SPENCER WALLER: Thank you, all. I think we're off to a flying
start. Philip is going to be our moderator and timekeeper for the next
part, which is a look at both defining and measuring power and trying
to figure out how to assess the harms and what harms we care about.

